Introduction
It is a paradox that when economists analyze the welfare impacts of policies, they typically assume that people are the best judges of their own welfare, yet they resist directly asking people themselves whether they are better off. It is assumed instead that the economist knows the answer on the basis of objective data on incomes and prices. While early ideas of "utility" were explicitly subjective, 2 the modern approach in economics has generally ignored the expressed views of people themselves about their own welfare.
However, the view that we can make interpersonal comparisons of welfare by looking solely at demand behavior is known to be untenable. Households differ in characteristics, such as size and demographic composition, which can influence their welfare in ways which are not evident in their behavior as consumers (Pollak and Wales, 1979) . The problem stems from the restrictions economists place on the information which is brought to bear in measuring welfare.
2 Famously, Jeremy Bentham defined utility in terms of psychological states (pleasure and pain). On the distinction between "objective" and "subjective" utility see Kahnman and Varey (1991) .
Responses to survey questions on perceived well-being may well provide the extra information needed for identifying welfare (van Praag, 1991; Kapteyn, 1994) . There has been work by psychologists and economists on understanding self-perceptions of welfare. The most direct and common approach is to survey people's opinions about their own well-being, assuming that the answers are inter-personally comparable. The questions asked by subjective welfare surveys have typically related to a broad notion of "happiness" or "satisfaction with life". The evidence available does not suggest that the answers given can be predicted well by standard objective measures, such as income. 3 However, for many purposes, including policy analysis, one is typically interested in a more narrow concept of "economic welfare"; is one person "poorer" than another? Possibly subjective assessments of this more narrow concept will accord better with objective data on incomes. A better understanding of the determinants of self-rated economic welfare may also help understand the political economy of economic policy making, such as why some sub-groups in society appear to be more opposed to policy change than a conventional calculation of income gains and loses would suggest.
This paper examines the systematic determinants of subjective economic welfare in Russia, including its relationship to conventional objective indicators. Our data on subjective perceptions use survey responses to a question in which respondents say what their level of welfare from "poor" to "rich" is on a nine-point ladder. We make the standard identifying assumption in analyzing attitudinal questions that there is inter-personal comparability of the interpretations 3 Simon (1974) found a weak association between income and subjective welfare in the U.S., and survey evidence since has generally suggested a significant but low correlation; for a survey see Furnham and Argyle (1998, Chapter 11) . Also see Scitovsky (1978) , Easterlin (1995) and Oswald (1997). given to the survey question; in our case, a given rung of the ladder is taken to mean the same thing to each person in terms of a continuous latent measure of economic welfare. Of course, there are still systematic differences in where people place themselves on the ladder, but these are interpreted as arising solely from differences in their economic welfare. Our objective indicator of economic welfare is the most common poverty indicator in Russia today, in which household incomes are deflated by household-specific poverty lines.
For a number of reasons, Russia is an interesting setting for this inquiry. The economic and political reforms of the last decade had a profound impact on the well-being of Russian households. A sharp drop of GNP was accompanied by a high level of inflation in the early 1990s, an increase in unemployment, and income inequality. The poverty rate rose sharply (Lokshin and Popkin, 1997) . The problem of identifying those living in poverty is of increasing importance in Russia. Usually the problem is addressed by comparing household income with a poverty line which varies according to the prices faced and household size and demographic composition. In practice, this method has tended to show that it is larger and younger families that have higher incidence of poverty, and this finding has had considerable influence on anti-poverty policies.
However, there appears to be a perception amongst many in Russia today that poverty is more acute in older (particularly pensioner) and smaller households. This suggests that there may well be disagreement between objective and subjective welfare indicators. We aim to compare the two types of indicators and to better understand the source of any divergence.
The following section discusses alternative approaches to welfare measurement, and our approach and data. Section 3 gives our results comparing the objective and subjective measures.
Section 4 tries to explain the differences. Section 5 concludes.
Measuring economic welfare
The most widely used measure of a person's "economic welfare" is the real income of the household to which the person belongs, adjusted for differences in family size and demographic composition (relative to some reference, such as a single adult). This can be defined as the household's total income divided by a poverty line giving the cost of some reference utility level at the prevailing prices and household demographics. Under certain conditions, this ratio can be interpreted as an exact money metric of utility defined over consumptions.
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Standard practice is to calibrate the cost function from consumer demand behavior. It is known, however, that there the parameters of the cost function are in general under-identified from demand behavior when household attributes vary (Pollak and Wales, 1979) . 5 This problem 4 See Blackorby and Donaldson (1987) who refer to consumption normalized by a poverty line as the "welfare ratio". The main assumption required for this to be an exact money metric of utility is that the consumer's preferences are homothetic.
5 Also see Pollak (1991) , Blundell and Lewbel (1991) , Browning (1992) , and Kapteyn (1994) . To understand the problem, suppose that we find that an indirect utility function v(p, y, x) (depending on prices p, income y and other household characteristics x) supports observed demands q (p, y, x) as an optimum. The indirect utility function then implies a cost function c (p, x, u) for utility u, such that the objective welfare indicator is y/c(p, x, u r ) for the reference utility u r (interpretable as the poverty line in utility space). However, if v(p, y, x) implies the demands q(p, y, x) then so does every other indirect utility function V [v(p, y, x), x] .
has plagued applied work, and the policy interpretations of data on economic welfare including "poverty profiles" aiming to give consistent measures of poverty across sub-groups of society.
For example, consider one property of the cost function, its elasticity to household size when evaluated at the reference utility level used to set the poverty line. An elasticity of unity is equivalent to dividing income by household size, while an elasticity of zero implies that aggregate household income is the relevant indicator of individual welfare. There is evidence to support the intuition that at some critical value of that elasticity somewhere between zero and one, measured poverty will tend to be uncorrelated with household size, while at elasticities above (below) this critical value larger (smaller) households will be deemed poorer (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995) .
The same evidence indicates that the range of approaches to determining the size elasticity of the cost function found in practice spans both sides of this critical elasticity, so that one could go from saying that larger households are poorer to the opposite depending on the way one identifies the elasticity.
This indeterminacy has bearing on policy. The demographic poverty profile is important information for a number of questions in social policy, such as the allocation of public spending between family allowances and pensions. The issue has been prominent in discussions of social policy in Eastern Europe. Yet sensitivity tests on past objective welfare indicators for Russia and other countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia suggest that the demographic profile of poverty can change appreciably with even seemingly small changes in the allowance made for scale economies in consumption within the household (Lanjouw, Milanovic and Paternostro, 1998) .
Some economists have turned to data on self-perceptions of welfare as a source of the extra information needed for identification. There are various approaches. Van Praag (1968 , 1971 ) introduced the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) which asks what income is considered "very bad", "bad", "not good", not bad", "good", "very good". Another method is based on the Minimum Income Question (MIQ) which asks what income is needed to "make ends meet".
Subjective poverty lines can be calibrated to the answers (see, for example, Kapteyn et al., 1988). 6 By this approach the welfare indicator is still taken to be objectively measured income or expenditure normalized by the (subjective) poverty line. 6 Qualitative data on consumption adequacy can also be used, without the minimum income question (which is unlikely to give sensible answers in some settings) (Pradhan and Ravallion, 1998) .
A common use of subjective welfare measures is to calibrate an objective welfare measure, such as setting equivalence scales. Survey-based subjective indicators are used to identify the consumer's cost function (Van Praag and Van der Sar, 1988; Kapteyn, 1994) . But what variables should be included? Even within a given approach to measuring subjective welfare, the set of individual characteristics deemed relevant to the corresponding objective welfare measure can differ. An objective welfare indicator chosen to have best fit in explaining a subjective indicator may still leave worryingly large residuals.
Arguably the IEQ and MIQ are both motivated by a rather narrow, income-based, characterization of welfare. This has been recognized explicitly in the literature. For example, in estimating the Leyden poverty line using Russian data, Frijters and van Praag (1997) recognize that "..income is only one factor among others influencing individual life satisfaction levels ... Nevertheless, being economists, we'll assume that absolute and relative material circumstances define poverty" (p.6). They go on to calibrate their welfare metric to only a few variablesincome, household size, and age.
A more open-ended approach can be found in the psychological literature on subjective perceptions of welfare. While the psychological literature has naturally tended to focus on mental health, a strand of the literature has attempted to understand people's self-rated welfare.
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Respondents are asked to place themselves on a ladder -sometimes referred to as a Cantril ladder, following Cantril (1965) -according to their "happiness" or "satisfaction with life a whole." 8 7 See, for example, Argyle (1987) , Diener (1994) , Diener, Suh and Oishi (1997) and Furnham and Argyle (1998) . A strand of the economics literature has drawn on subjective assessments of welfare, following Van Praag (1968 , 1971 . (We discuss this approach in section 2 below.) There is remarkably little cross-referencing of the literatures in psychology and economics.
8 For a useful cross-country compendium of the questions asked, and a summary of the answers, see Veenhoven et al., (1993). However, this is arguably too broad a concept for measuring economic welfare, and assessing conventional income-based measures. When one says that someone is "poor" one typically does not mean that they are unhappy. It cannot be too surprising that income is not all that matters to "happiness" or "satisfaction with life". The more interesting question is how income, and other objective characteristics of people, relate to self-perceptions of economic welfare.
Here we adopt an alternative approach, in which the Cantril-type question is asked about economic welfare. In particular, we use the following question:
Please imagine a 9-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are you today? Nonetheless, there are still ways in which the answers to the ELQ could deviate from conventional real income metrics. The following reasons for divergence can be identified:
We will call this the Economic Ladder Question (ELQ
9 An antecedent is found in Mangahas (1995) who asked respondents in regular surveys for the Philippines whether they are "poor", "borderline" or "non-poor".
(i) There might well be systematic differences in the values attached to specific household characteristics in assessing differences in "needs", i.e., differences in the structure of the equivalence scales underlying the real income measure (as typically built into the poverty lines used as deflators) versus those which affect perceptions of welfare.
(ii) The ladder question is individual specific, and there may well be inequality within households not captured by aggregate household income or consumption.
(iii) There may be differences in the time period over which income is measured versus the time period on which perceptions of economic welfare are based. Past incomes may matter, as may expected future incomes, or determinants of these, such as education.
(iv) There could also be differences arising from the influence of relative incomes on perceptions of personal affluence. It has been argued that the circumstances of the individual, relative to others in some reference group, influence perceptions of well-being at any given level of individual command over commodities.
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(v) From psychological research it is known that subjective welfare is affected by both transient and fixed idiosyncratic factors. Intrinsic aspects of temperament, such as extroversion and neuroticism, influence self-rated welfare (see for example Costa and McCrae, 1980) .
Transient effects also matter such as short-lived peaks of happiness and how a recent experience ended (Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993) . For the purpose of assessing a person's "typical" welfare, there is clearly noise in subjective welfare data. This presumably also be the case for subjective economic welfare as assessed by the ELQ. We call this noise "mood effects".
To have any hope of understanding the systematic determinants of subjective economic welfare one needs to have the above question (or something similar) asked in the context of a comprehensive objective socio-economic survey. However, the resistance to subjective welfare assessments in economics has been reflected in the nature of much of the socio-economic survey data available. 11 The lack of integration of subjective methods into comprehensive survey instruments has meant that it has not often been possible to examine the socio-economic determinants of self-rated welfare, and the relationship with the more conventional welfare measures favored by economists.
We shall use data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for 1996.
The RLMS is a comprehensive survey of all aspects of levels of living, based on the first nationally representative sample of several thousand households across the Russian Federation.
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In addition to a wide range of more conventional socio-economic data, all adults were asked the Economic Ladder Question discussed above.
As our main objective welfare indicator we use the "welfare ratio" given by total household income (y) as a proportion of the poverty line (z). 13 The distribution of such welfare ratios determines the level of absolute poverty. (Almost all measures of poverty are homogeneous of degree zero in incomes and the poverty line.) We use established poverty lines for Russia.
14 These used linear programming to find the food baskets which minimized the cost of reaching predetermined age-and gender-specific nutritional norms, subject to the constraint that the quantities obtained were no lower than certain positive bounds given by the averages for those with the lowest 30% of consumption. The food basket was created separately for children aged 0-6, 7-17, adult males and females, female pensioners aged 55 and older, and male pensioners aged 60 and older. Region-specific food prices were then used to cost these food baskets. Age-and gender-specific Engel coefficients were then used to obtain allowances for non-food spending.
Thus, each age and gender grouping has its specific poverty line which is used to construct a household-specific poverty line according to the demographic composition of the household.
Total real monthly disposable household income (in June 1992 prices) includes wages and salaries, social
security, private transfers, income in-kind and from home production.
Comparing objective and subjective indicators
main modification is that the new poverty lines allow for economies of scale in consumption. Naturally then there is only a weak matching in terms of poverty; while 29.4% of adults placed themselves in the lowest two rungs, less than half (43.0%) were also amongst the 32.7% of adults living in households with incomes below the poverty line. Figure 1 gives the mean proportion of the sample on the lowest two rungs against ln(y/z). The curve is downward sloping, but it is clearly quite flat, even near the poverty line. For example, going from 0.5 standard deviation below the poverty line to 0.5 above reduces the probability of being on the lowest two rungs from 0.34 to 0.25 (the objective poverty measure falls from 1.0 to 0.0); going from one standard deviation below to one above, it falls from 0.37 to 0.19. The standard deviation of ln(y/z) is 1.053 so the slope is -0.09 in both cases. So roughly doubling incomes will only reduce the subjective poverty rate by about 10 percentage points.
Figure 1 also gives the mean proportion of the sample on rungs five-plus at each value of ln(y/z). This is roughly the (subjectively) richest quarter of respondents. Here we find near zero gradient in the proportion of those responding that they are on the fifth rung or higher as ln(y/z) increases; amongst the "objectively poor" about one fifth put themselves on these upper rungs of the ladder, and it matters little how poor they are. But amongst the "objectively non-poor" there is a sharp increase in the proportion of respondents who see themselves as being on the upper rungs of the ladder as real income deflated by the poverty line increases. It is in the responses of the income non-poor that one sees a sharper differentiation in subjective perceptions of welfare.
An instructive way of looking at the relationship between the subjective and objective indicators is to start from an explicit assumption about the underlying continuous variable determining where one sees oneself on the ladder from "poor" to "rich". Let this latent continuous variable be denoted w and assume that this is determined by ln(y/z) as well as other variables, which (for the moment) we will simply lump into an error term, e:
Assuming level comparability of the ladder across persons, someone with w < c 1 (say) will respond that she is on the first rung; someone for whom c 1 < w < c 2 will be on the second, and so on up to the highest rung. On also assuming that e is normally distributed (with distribution investigate this question more systematically in the next section. But some simple descriptive statistics are revealing. In Figure 2 we give various "poverty profiles" in which we compare the proportion of adults living in households with an income below the poverty line with the percentage placing themselves in rungs 1 or 2 of the ladder which we shall term "subjective poverty". (By choosing the lowest two rungs, the overall subjective poverty rate is roughly the same as the overall headcount index of income poverty, as noted above).
While income poverty incidence tends to fall (or not rise) with age, subjective poverty There is also a marked geographic difference between the subjective and objective geographic poverty profiles, as can be seen from Figure 2e where we rank regions by the objective poverty rates by region in Russia (income relative to the poverty line) and give the corresponding percentages of people reporting that they are on the bottom two rungs of the ladder. There is clearly little relationship between the two.
Why do the subjective and objective indicators differ so much?
We now test two possible hypotheses as to why there is so much disagreement between the subjective and objective indicators. 
Testing the Wrong Weights Hypothesis
The poverty lines are determined by a vector of variables x z and we now write this relationship explicitly as z=z(x z ). To test the Wrong Weights Hypothesis we want to compare the function z(x z ) with that which gives the best fit in explaining the subjective welfare indicator. To do so we estimate an augmented model in which the latent welfare function takes the form:
This allows the subjective weights on x z to differ from those built into the objective indicator.
The first column of Table 2 gives the estimates of the OP based on (3) and their standard errors. The second column gives the values of ? z /ß. This allows us to directly compare the weights on x z with those built into the construction of the poverty lines, as given in the third column. The latter were obtained from an OLS regression of lnz(x z ) on x z . 17 17 While we know the precise variables in x z , the formula used in obtaining the Russian poverty lines from x z was not available. However, the fit of this semi-log specification is excellent, indeed there is near perfect prediction (Table 2) , so we are clearly very close to the formula actually used.
There is clearly strong support for the Wrong Weights Hypothesis. In comparison to the model in (1) we observe almost a threefold increase in the log-likelihood explanatory power of the model by re-weighting x z to give best fit in explaining the subjective indicator (pseudo-R 2 rises from 0.04 to 0.11). Comparing columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 , there are striking differences in the properties of the equivalence scale consistent with the subjective welfare indicator versus that used in the objective poverty lines. The latter has an elasticity of 0.8 to household size, while the subjective indicator calls for an elasticity half this size. This explains the differences in the poverty rates between large and small households in Figure 2c . The demographic composition variables behave very differently. Most notably, due to the properties of the poverty lines, the objective welfare indicator deems pensioner households to be less poor than others ceteris paribus, while the subjective welfare indicator tells us the exact opposite. Table 3 gives the distribution of the predicted subjective welfare (based on the estimation of the model in Table 2 ) against the actual. One can see a significant improvement in the degree of association; Cramer's V is 0.14 as compared to 0.10 in Table 1 .
The lack of correspondence between the geographic effects is particularly striking; Figure   3 gives the regression coefficients on the geographic dummy variables for both the objective and subjective (? z /ß) welfare indicators. While there are a number of strong geographic effects in perceptions of welfare, they bear very little relationship with the cost-of-living differences built into the objective poverty lines.
While there is support for Wrong Weights Hypothesis, income and the variables used in constructing the poverty lines still explain poorly the subjective perceptions of individuals.
Testing the Low Dimensionality Hypothesis
Next we investigate whether there are other dimensions of welfare which influence answers to the ELQ. The augmented model has the following form:
where x o is a vector of other variables that we hypothesize matter to self-rated economic welfare but are not in x z . Examples include education, health, marital status, past incomes, employment and household expenditure. 18 There are possible concerns about assuming that these variables are exogenous. People with low self-rated welfare may be more likely to be divorced or less likely to think they are healthy. While noting these concerns, there is little that can be done about them while retaining a reasonably rich extended model for testing the Low Dimensionality Hypothesis. Table 4 gives the OP estimation of this extended model. The new set of variables greatly improves the explanatory power of the model, as indicated by the doubling of pseudo R 2 to 0.25.
The association between the predicted and actual ranking is stronger (Table 5 ). We move from
Cramer's V 1 =0.10 in model (1) to V 2 = 0.14 in model (3) to V 3 =0.20 for model (4).
The estimate of (4) shows that many variables not included in the objective income indicator have a strong influence on subjective welfare. Last year's income, and total household expenditure have positive and significant effects on subjective welfare. The source of income does not appear to matter. 18 We include total expenditure as well as income, recognizing that there is a debate as to which of these is the more relevant "income" metric; for further discussion see Ravallion (1994) .
Recall that the narrow subjective welfare model in Table 2 suggests a much lower elasticity of the cost function to household size than embodied in the poverty lines, which are closer to the "per capita" normalization. This no longer holds in our extended model in Table 4 , though the calculation is complicated by the fact that there are multiple "income" variables.
Suppose that there is an equi-proportional increase in all household incomes (at all dates) and expenditures, and that household size increases by the same proportion. Then it is readily verified from the estimates in Table 4 that subjective welfare will be virtually unchanged; more precisely, the sum of the coefficients on the logged household incomes and expenditures is 0.287, which is close to (minus one times) the coefficient on household size (Table 4) . Individual income, however, matters independently of household income per capita. Subjective economic welfare clearly depends on both permanent household income per capita and individual income. The fact that we found a size elasticity well below unity in the narrow model of Table 2 appears to be attributable to the omission of this independent effect of individual income, rather than scale effects on household consumption.
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Among individual characteristics, middle-aged, divorced or widowed respondents put themselves on a lower rung of the ladder controlling for income and household size. 20 Gender makes no significant difference. Healthier people (by their own rating) have a higher selfevaluation of their economic welfare. Higher education raises perceived welfare. Unemployment lowers it, 21 as does the fear of unemployment for those with a job (as measured by the perceived 22 risk of not finding other work if fired). The ownership of the durables such as car, washer, TV, and VCR has a positive effect on the subjective welfare.
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) for Germany. Oswald (1997) reviews the literature on this issue.
Note that all these effects are conditional on incomes and other household and individual characteristics. For example, unemployment lowers self-rated welfare controlling for income. By implication, even with a very generous unemployment compensation scheme which restored the individual's entire working income, unemployment would still lower subjective welfare. (Clearly this is inconsistent with claims that there are adverse effects on work incentives of unemployment compensation.) Similarly our results are consistent with the view that people care about education and health independently of their bearing on incomes (Sen, 1987) .
What accounts for the geographic effects? One possibility is that they reflect perceptions of relative welfare, in that (other things constant) people in richer areas will feel relatively worse off. To test that explanation, we replaced the geographic dummy variables by the mean of the log welfare ratio in the area of residence. 22 The result is in Table 4 . Consistently with the relative welfare explanation, the mean objective indicator had a negative effect on subjective welfare, and was highly significant (the variable had a coefficient of -0.189 with a t-ratio of -4.104).
Furthermore there was only a small drop in pseudo R 2 to 0.237. So average objective welfare in the area of residence can account for almost all of the variance attributable to geographic effects.
Other coefficients and standard errors are affected little.
However, these results do not suggest that only relative income matters. Suppose that all incomes and expenditures increase by the same proportion. Subjective welfare will still increase;
the combined effect of a one percent increase in current and past household incomes, household expenditure and individual income (at sample mean) is 0.345, versus -0.189 for income in the area of residence. So, while relative income in the area of residence clearly matters, it is only one factor; absolute income also matters to subjective economic welfare. 22 We also tried the log of the mean, but this made almost no difference. We also tried including the difference between the log of the mean and the mean of the log to test for effects of inequality, but this variable was highly insignificant.
Conclusions
It is known that the objective measures of economic welfare widely used by economists, such as real income per equivalent single adult, are under-identified from consumer demand behavior. Thus conventional assessments of whether one person is better off than another, or has gained from a policy change, may disagree with peoples' own assessments.
Using an integrated survey for Russia in 1996 we have studied the determinants of selfrated economic welfare, and the relationship with more conventional objective measures. We find that Russian adults with higher family income per equivalent adult are also less likely to place themselves on the poorest rungs of a subjective ladder of economic welfare from "poor" to "rich", and (at least amongst the objectively non-poor by Russian standards) they are more likely to place themselves on the upper rungs.
However, measured household incomes cannot account well for self-reported assessments of whether one is "poor" or 'rich". The discrepancy between objective and subjective indicators of economic welfare is due in part to the weighting of the demographic and geographic variables that go into the Russian poverty lines used for assessing differences in needs at a given income. If we re-weight these variables to accord with the subjective indicator then the power of the objective welfare measure in explaining the variance in subjective economic welfare goes up substantially. Nonetheless, we still find that the bulk of the differences between people in their survey responses about their perceived economic welfare are left un-explained.
It is clear that the information normally incorporated into assessments of who is "poor" have rather limited explanatory power for the subjective assessments we have studied here. When we expand the set of variables to include incomes at different dates, expenditures, and educational attainments, health status, employment and average income in the area of residence we can double the explanatory power. Healthier and better educated adults with jobs perceive themselves to be better off controlling for their incomes. The unemployed judge their economic welfare to be lower, even with full income replacement. Individual income matters independently of household income per capita (and it is this fact which appears to account for why subjective welfare is more elastic to household income than to household size, rather than scale effects in consumption).
Relative income clearly also matters, in that living in a richer area lowers perceived economic welfare, controlling for own income and other characteristics.
So while our results confirm that even narrowly measured income gains raise subjective perceptions of economic welfare, they also suggest that the ways in which poverty is conventionally measured -the equivalence scales, regional cost-of-living deflators and so on -do not accord well with subjective perceptions of who is "poor". Indeed, economists should not expect to be able to predict well peoples' own perceptions of their economic welfare from even a quite broad set of conventional objective socio-economic data. Idiosyncratic and possibly transient differences in respondent's "moods" may well account for some of the unexplained differences in self-rated welfare found in our data. For certain purposes, including assessments of welfare impacts of policies and of overall social progress, one may choose to discount such differences. However, the systematic inconsistencies between a conventional objective measure and self-rated assessments suggest that greater caution is needed in the interpretations that economists and others routinely give to conventional metrics of welfare. McFadden's (1974) This an upper bound of one whenever the observed dependent variable is discrete.
The bias in the standard pseudo-R 2 appears to be large in our application. Note: * is significant at 10% level; ** is significant at 5% level; *** is significant at 1% level. 6256
observations. Individual income is not logged, because there are many zeros. The mean individual income is 1966 rubbles per month (3182 if calculated only on positive incomes).
